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Abstract
In order to develop and bring to fruition strategic
information systems (SIS) projects, chief informa-
tion officers (CIOs) must be able to effectively
influence their peers.  This research examines the
relationship between CIO influence behaviors and
the successfulness of influence outcomes, utilizing
a revised model initially developed by Yukl (1994).
Focused interviews were first conducted with
CIOs and their peers to gain insights into the
phenomenon.  A survey instrument was then
developed and distributed to a sample of CIO and
peer executive pairs to gather data with which to
test a research model.  A total of 69 pairs of sur-
veys were eventually used for data analysis.  The
research model was found to be generally
meaningful in the CIO–top management context.
Furthermore, the influence behaviors rational per-
suasion and personal appeal exhibited significant
relationships with peer commitment, whereas
exchange and pressure were significantly related
to peer resistance.  These results provide useful
guidance to CIOs who wish to propose strategic
information systems to peers. 
Keywords:  Chief information officers, influence,
influence behaviors, information systems, PLS
ISRL Categories:  EH0101, AA01, EH0208
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Introduction
Since no idea is intrinsically strategic or important,
the give-and-take of senior managers about what
matters largely determines which initiatives are
implemented (Dutton and Ashford 1993; Floyd
and Wooldridge 1996).  Within this give-and-take
context, a critical part of the chief information
officer’s (CIO’s) strategic role is to provide thought
leadership to other top executives, making them
aware of the potential for information systems to
support and enhance the strategy of the firm (Earl
and Feeny 1994; Stephens et al. 1992).  One way
CIOs do this is to effect proactive influence
behaviors to convince other top managers to allo-
cate attention and resources to strategic infor-
mation systems (SIS) projects (Lederer and
Mendelow 1988; Marron 1997; Rockart 1988;
Smith 1998).  Indeed, as Fiegener and Coakley
(1995) have pointed out, CIOs have an inherent
responsibility to do so:
A CIO’s hesitance to exert influence may
increase the risks that the agenda for IS
will be shaped by other, less knowl-
edgeable sources (p. 58).
Effective organizations recognize that having line
managers take ownership of critical IS projects
increases the likelihood of appropriate IS deploy-
ment and organization success (Rockart 1988;
Sambamurthy and Zmud 1997).  If a CIO wants a
strategic application proposal implemented, he or
she requires the commitment of the top
management team, without which the project
would stand a lesser chance of success (Feeny et
al. 1992).  Similarly, the practitioner literature
suggests that effective CIOs must skillfully apply
their powers of influence to encourage other
functional heads to become partners with them
and embrace ownership of these initiatives
(McDougall and McGee 1999; Mitchell 2000;
Smith 1998). 
In the past, when most CIOs were not part of the
top management team, they often needed to apply
different forms of upward influence to convince top
management to seriously consider SIS projects,
with varying degrees of success (Applegate and
Elam 1992; Lederer and Mendelow 1988; Rockart
1988).  More recently, as they have gained accep-
tance on their firms’ top management teams, CIOs
require skills at applying lateral influence, in order
to convince their peers in other functional areas to
commit to SIS initiatives (Maruca 2000; Ross and
Feeny 2000).  There is evidence that CIOs may be
less effective than their executive counterparts in
proactively exerting peer-level influence (Marron
1997; Smith 1998).   For example, Earl and Feeny
(1994) have pointed out that CIOs often
mistakenly attempt to use “hard” tactics such as
edicts, which do not work as well as “softer”
tactics like persuasion and participation. 
The research literature has not systematically
examined CIOs’ influence behavior usage
patterns—which influence behaviors CIOs use to
convince their peers to commit to SIS projects or
their effectiveness at doing so—despite the fact
that this as an important topic for examination
(Earl and Feeny 1994; Fiegener and Coakley
1995; Lederer and Mendelow 1988).  The present
study draws primarily upon survey data to address
the question:  Which lateral CIO influence
behaviors result in successful influence outcomes
in the SIS–peer context?
The next section provides a literature review,
discusses the research model, and develops
propositions based on the extant literature and, to
a lesser extent, anecdotal evidence from a series
of executive interviews.  Subsequently, we provide
the research methodology used for data collection
and analysis in the main study and describe the
results.  The final section of the paper discusses
the implications of this study both for future





In order to clarify the CIO–peer influence context,
it is important to distinguish between influence and
authority.  Simon (1953) views authority as the
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legitimate exercise of decision making that affects
the behavior of individuals.  Thus, subordinates
agree without question to the decisions of a
superior and are willing to set aside any judg-
ments about the suitability of a superior’s request
or behave as if they agreed with the superior.
Similarly, Tannenbaum (1958) views authority as
designated across hierarchical management posi-
tions.  It is also commonly recognized that a
superior relies on advice or information from
others, including subordinates.  This advice or
information comprises influence (Tannenbaum
and Massarik 1950).  Thus, a person exerts influ-
ence by offering information, providing advice,
persuading, and the like.  Importantly, in contrast
with authority that flows downward, influence can
be multidirectional.  Thus, individuals have the
capacity to influence superiors or colleagues.  The
dispersion of influence permits actors from all
levels in the organization to make their expertise
felt in specific decision areas (Bacharach and
Lawler 1980, p. 31).  The distinction between
authority and influence is important in situations
where CIOs do not possess formal authority.
Specifically, CIOs must rely primarily on influence
to affect the thinking and behavior of their peers.
The research literature on senior IS management
provides some other important insights into the
CIO–peer influence context.  For example, it illus-
trates the conditions under which a CIO’s influ-
ence behaviors can be most effective when he or
she attempts to initiate SIS projects that require
peer commitments.  Good working relationships
with peers are a necessary condition for the suc-
cess of IT executives (Earl 1993; Henderson
1990; Keen 1991; Stephens et al. 1992).  The CIO
requires integrity and interpersonal skills in order
to develop these important relationships (Kotter
1982).  These effective working relationships set
the stage for CIOs to successfully approach peers
in a “personal informal” style (Pyburn 1983), to
make casual contact with peers to discuss these
initiatives and build support before a formal
proposal is discussed (Feeny et al. 1992).
Other IS research has examined the ways in
which CIOs communicate with other executives to
build shared understanding and knowledge
around the issue of IT alignment with the business
(Applegate and Elam 1992; Earl 1993; Feeny et
al. 1992).  IS projects that are aligned with the
overall strategic direction of the firm will be more
successful and readily accepted than those that
are not (Chan et al. 1997; Earl 1993; Earl and
Feeny 1994).  A shared vision of the role of IS in
the business is an important determinant of SIS
project success (Earl and Feeny 1994).  Effective
communication and shared vision among senior
managers form a chain that impacts the overall
success of the organization (Reich and Benbasat
1996).  CIO influence behaviors comprise an
important part of the CIO-peer communications
that lead to the development of shared vision and
SIS project success.
Little research has focused directly on the issue of
CIO influence (e.g., Earl and Feeny 1994; Hayashi
1997), despite the fact that effective influence
exertion is of interest to CIOs (Marron 1997; Smith
1998).  The literature has only discussed a few
influence behaviors at the CIO’s disposal.  For
example, coalition and consultation tactics have
been effectively used to convince executives of
the potential strategic impact of IS (Lederer and
Mendelow 1988), to gain acceptance of other
executives (Stephens et al. 1992), to achieve a
shared vision of IS’s role in the organization (Earl
and Feeny 1994), and to create a positive impres-
sion of the IS department (Fiegener and Coakley
1995).  Rational persuasion has been used to
identify new uses of IT (Rockart 1988), create a
positive view of IS (Earl and Feeny 1994; Fiegener
and Coakley 1995), and to convince top managers
of the need for greater central IT coordination
(Ross and Feeny 2000).  Finally, CIO tactics used
to overcome resistance to IS implementation
include bargaining with IS resources (i.e.,
exchange), and co-opting opposition (i.e., consul-
tation) (Keen 1981).
More broadly, there has been little systematic
research on top executives’ lateral influence
behaviors.  What we do know is based on anec-
dotal evidence gleaned from interview data
gathered to compare effective with ineffective
managers (Cohen and Bradford 1989; Kotter 1979
1982; Pfeffer 1992).  More effective general man-
agers used a wider variety of influence methods
and spent less time on influence activity (Kotter
1982).  This suggests there may be significant
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Table 1.  Influence Behaviors and Definitions (Yukl 1994)
Influence Behavior Definition
Rational Persuasion The agent uses logical arguments and factual evidence to persuade the
target that a proposal or request is viable and likely to result in the
attainment of task objectives.
Consultation The agent seeks target participation in planning a strategy, activity, or
change for which target support and assistance are desired, or is willing
to modify a proposal to deal with target concerns and suggestions.
Ingratiation The agent uses praise, flattery, friendly behavior, or helpful behavior to
get the target in a good mood or to think favorably of him or her when
asking for something.
Personal Appeals The agent appeals to target feelings of loyalty and friendship toward him
or her when asking for something.
Exchange The agent offers an exchange of favors, indicates willingness to
reciprocate at a later time, or promises a share of the benefits if the
target helps accomplish a task.
Coalition Tactics The agent seeks the aid of others to persuade the target to do
something, or uses the support of others as a reason for the target to
agree also.
Pressure The agent uses demands, threats, frequent checking, or persistent
reminders to influence the target to do what he or she wants.
differences between top executives’ and middle
level managers’ influence behaviors.  Nonethe-
less, since there are no systematic studies in this
area, it is uncertain whether senior executive
influence behaviors are significantly different than
those of lower-level managers.  However, the
related work conducted with middle-level man-
agers and supervisors provides a framework for
research on CIO influence behaviors. 
An important series of studies by Kipnis et al.
(1980) examined influence tactics in which the
agent (i.e., initiator) of an influence attempt tried to
gain something from the target (i.e., recipient).
Based on these studies, they developed a survey
from narrative descriptions of how individuals “got
their way.”  The survey was administered to 754
lower-level managers.  Factor analysis revealed
eight influence dimensions:  exchange, sanctions,
ingratiation, rationality, coalitions, assertiveness,
upward appeals, and blocking.  This survey was
published as the Kipnis-Schmidt (1982) Profiles of
Organizational Influence Strategies (POIS).
Yukl and Falbe (1990) modified the POIS instru-
ment, and administered their survey to part-time
MBA students.  After additional refinements, these
authors created the Influence Behavior Ques-
tionnaire (IBQ) (Falbe and Yukl 1992).  A sum-
mary of seven of these influence behaviors is
found in Table 1.  Two influence behaviors, inspi-
rational appeal and legitimation, are excluded
from Table 1 based on our interviews, a survey
pretest, and the main study.2
2We eliminated inspirational appeal and legitimating
from our analysis for the following reasons.  There was
little mention of inspirational appeal and legitimation in
our initial interviews.  Also, a telephone conversation
was held with all eight executives who pretested the
survey to obtain their reaction to the survey.  Six of them
suggested that the questions related to inspirational
appeal and legitimation were more reflective of a
superior-subordinate relationship.  In the main study,
responses to the inspirational appeal and legitimation
questions were mostly “1” (i.e., “I can’t remember the
CIO using this tactic with me”).  Therefore, it was not
logical for us to test the paths associated with these
behaviors, since trying to determine the outcome of not
using a behavior made little sense.
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Table 2.  Lateral Influence Behavior Studies
Influence Behavior Authors Sample Outcome*
Rational Persuasion Falbe & Yukl 1992 Part-time MBAs Moderately Effective 
(i.e., Compliance)
Yukl & Tracey 1992 24% upper level  execu-




Consultation Falbe & Yukl 1992 Same as above Effective 
Yukl & Tracey 1992 Same as above Effective
Personal Appeals Falbe & Yukl 1992 Same as above Moderately Effective 
Yukl & Tracey 1992 Same as above Effective
Ingratiation Falbe & Yukl 1992 Same as above Moderately Effective 
Yukl & Tracey 1992 Same as above Effective
Exchange Falbe & Yukl 1992 Same as above Moderately Effective
Yukl & Tracey 1992 Same as above Effective
Coalition Falbe & Yukl 1992 Same as above Resistance
Yukl & Tracey 1992 Same as above Not significant
Pressure Falbe & Yukl 1992 Same as above Resistance
Yukl & Tracey 1992 Same as above Resistance
*Falbe and Yukl (1992) outcome:  Coded 1, 2 or 3
1. Resistance target is opposed to the requested action and tries to avoid doing it by refusing, arguing,
etc.
2. Compliance target carries out the requested action but is apathetic about it rather than enthusiastic.
3. Commitment target agrees internally with an action or decision, is enthusiastic about it, and is likely
to exercise initiative and demonstrate unusual effort in order to carry out the request successfully.
Yukl and Tracey (1992) outcome based on how many influence attempts resulted in complete
commitment (i.e., strong enthusiasm and special effort beyond what is normally expected):  1 = None
of them, 4 = About half of them, 7 = All of them.
Influence behaviors, and their effectiveness, vary
depending on whether the target is a subordinate,
peer, or superior.  For instance, rational persua-
sion is often linked with effective upward influ-
ence, while pressure behaviors are more com-
monly associated with downward influence and
are most effective under these conditions (Kipnis
et al. 1980; Schilit and Locke 1982).  Table 2 sum-
marizes the major lateral influence behavior
research, mostly centered on middle-level man-
agers and supervisors, since the paper’s focus is
on lateral influence.
The literature on lateral influence behaviors
suggests that influence leads to a number of pos-
sible outcomes.  These outcomes are discussed
in the proposition development section below.
Figure 1 summarizes the discussion about influ-
ence behaviors and outcomes.  This research
model is based primarily on work done with stu-
Enns et al./CIO Lateral Influence Behaviors











Figure 1.  Research Model
dents, middle-level managers, and first-line super-
visors but also accounts for the anecdotal CIO
and top executive influence literature.  However,
this model had not been tested with top execu-
tives.  Thus, a preliminary series of interviews
were conducted to assist in the development of
propositions used to test the model.
Exploratory Interviews
Early in the research project, a set of exploratory
interviews were conducted with senior IS and non-
IS managers so as to better gauge the relevance
of the issues, and to develop an initial under-
standing of actual CIO influence behaviors in the
field.  A total of 14 interviews in 7 companies were
completed.  Each executive was provided a copy
of the transcribed interview for validation pur-
poses.  Peers were interviewed partly to verify
responses, and to provide a less biased view of
the CIO’s influence behaviors.  The peer execu-
tives all indicated they had had opportunities to
observe the CIOs both succeed and fail in their
influence attempts.
The exploratory interviews indicated that all of the
CIOs had recently attempted to influence other
organizational members about SIS projects.  In all
cases, this was done initially through informal
approaches, followed by more formal approval
steps.  The interviews also indicated that CIOs
varied widely in terms of their influence abilities,
and that some influence behaviors were more
effective than others.  For example, some CIOs
used rational persuasion exclusively, and con-
tinued to use this tactic even in the face of
resistance.  As one executive mentioned,
Our CIO could learn to be more sensitive
in this area.  He believes that the logic of
his arguments [i.e., rational persuasion]
should carry the day but this is not
always the case.
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Proposition Development
The lateral influence behavior literature (see
Table 2 for a summary), together with the inter-
view data, was used to create propositions related
to the research model (see Figure 1).  The con-
structs on the left side of the model were derived
from the adapted Yukl (1994)  framework, and are
also supported by previous research on peer
executive relationships (Cohen and Bradford
1989; Earl and Feeny 1994; Fiegener and
Coakley 1995) and middle-level manager and
supervisor influence behavior (Yukl 1994). 
Previous peer influence studies of middle
managers have shown that proactive influence
behaviors lead to certain reactions or influence
outcomes on the part of the target of influence
(Falbe and Yukl 1992), as depicted on the right
side of Figure 1.  Three possible outcomes were
identified by Falbe and Yukl (1992): resistance,
compliance, and commitment (reflecting a con-
tinuous measure of outcome success).  The fol-
lowing examples from the exploratory interviews
illustrate the differences between these outcomes.
One of the peer executives described a case
where the CIO approached him with the same
proposal a number of times and each time the
peer declined to go along with the proposal (i.e.,
displayed resistance).  Another executive ex-
plained that sometimes the CIO’s projects were
approved by the other top managers but then the
other top managers would not assist the CIO in
implementation. 
People may have given support from the
top level but did not support it with their
personnel [i.e., subordinates].  In these
cases, it is clear that it’s his (the CIO’s)
project.
The top executives in this case had complied with
the CIO’s proposal, but they were not committed
enough to ensure support from their subordinates.
Several studies have examined the effect of
rational persuasion in peer-to-peer influence
attempts (Falbe and Yukl 1992; Yukl and Tracey
1992).  Although the results have been mixed,
evidence from the top executive literature indi-
cates that rational persuasion is used frequently
and effectively in the top management context
(e.g., Nutt 1986).  Thus,
Proposition 1:  Rational persuasion will
be positively related to the influence
outcome.
Yukl and Tracey (1992) found consultation was
one of the most effective tactics. Consultation was
also instrumental in gaining task commitment in
the Falbe and Yukl and the Yukl and Tracey
studies.  In the IS arena, Earl and Feeny (1994)
have argued that effective CIOs use consultative
behavior to communicate key IT issues to others.
Proposition 2:  Consultation will be
positively related to the influence
outcome.
Falbe and Yukl discovered that personal appeals
were intermediate in effectiveness when used on
peers (i.e., led to compliance, not commitment).
Yet, Yukl and Tracey found that personal appeals
did lead to commitment; also, four executives in
the focused interviews suggested that personal
appeal was used often within the confines of the
top management group.  As one of the CIOs sug-
gested, IS project approval has much to do with
“personal relationships and who knows whom.”
Proposition 3:  Personal appeal will be
positively related to the influence
outcome.
It is likely that ingratiation is deemed inappropriate
by top executives in peer relations because it is
inconsistent with the interaction styles used in
their environments, and is considered socially
unacceptable (Cohen and Bradford 1990; Yukl
1994).  In support of this, ingratiation was not
observed in our exploratory interviews.
Proposition 4:  Ingratiation will be nega-
tively related to the influence outcome.
Exchange behavior has been shown to have
intermediate effectiveness (Falbe and Yukl 1992),
Enns et al./CIO Lateral Influence Behaviors
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to lead to commitment (Yukl and Tracey 1992), or
to be insignificant (Keys et al. 1987) in peer situa-
tions.  Some anecdotal evidence has suggested
that the use of exchange by some senior man-
agers, including IS managers, is resisted by
others (e.g., Cohen and Bradford 1990; Kotter
1979).  The potential for the use of exchange
increases when self-interest is the motivation
(e.g., Cohen and Bradford 1989).  However, top
executives are charged with looking out for the
best interests of the organization; consequently,
self-interest at the senior IS management level is
often viewed negatively (Earl and Feeny 1994;
Lederer and Mendelow 1988).
Proposition 5:  Exchange will be nega-
tively related to the influence outcome.
Finally, studies of middle-level managers’ use of
coalition and pressure in peer contexts have been
consistent.  Falbe and Yukl found that coalition
was more likely to result in resistance.  Falbe and
Yukl and also Yukl and Tracey found that pressure
was an unsuccessful behavior.  Furthermore, Nutt
(1986) found that the use of pressure by top
executives was the least effective behavior in
strategy implementation situations.  Thus, 
Proposition 6:  Coalition will be nega-
tively related to the influence outcome.
Proposition 7:  Pressure will be nega-
tively related to the influence outcome.
Methodology
The research model was tested using data
gathered via a matched pair survey.  In each
organization, the CIO completed one instrument,
and a peer executive completed a different one.
We used the peers’ assessments of CIO influence
behavior and CIOs’ assessments of the influence
outcome to control same-source and self-report
bias (Thompson et al. 1994), and to test the
propositions.  Measures of the model’s variables
are discussed below.
Influence Behaviors and Outcomes
Influence behaviors were measured using the
Influence Behavior Questionnaire (IBQ) developed
by Yukl and his colleagues (Yukl et al. 1992).  The
IBQ has demonstrated good psychometric
properties in other studies. The 1997 short version
of this questionnaire was obtained from the
principal author.  See Appendix A for example IBQ
items.
A scale to measure influence outcome was
created based on the definitions of commitment,
compliance, and resistance given by Falbe and
Yukl (1992).  Commitment is evident when the
target displays strong enthusiasm and special ef-
fort beyond what is expected.  Compliance occurs
when the target completes the request but is
apathetic and makes minimal effort.  Resistance
is displayed when the target avoids performing the
requested action by arguing, delaying, etc.  Falbe
and Yukl viewed outcome success as a con-
tinuous variable; however, they operationalized it
categorically.  In this study, influence outcome
was operationalized using five items, each
measured on a seven-point Likert scale, and
thereby better reflecting Falbe and Yukl’s original
conceptualization (see Appendix A for details).  A
low overall score (e.g., “1”) on the scale indicated
resistance, a middle score (e.g., “4”) indicated
compliance, and a high score (e.g., “7”) indicated
commitment.
Control Variables
Data about the technical backgrounds of both the
CIOs and non-CIO executives was gathered to
explore whether differences in technical back-
ground moderated the influence behavior–
outcome relationship.  Technically oriented
people, it has been argued, tend to deal with
objects and things, are more task focused, and
are less relationship centered (e.g., Hill and
Collins-Eaglin 1985; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967).
We expected to encounter both peers and CIOs
with different technical backgrounds, so we con-
trolled for this contingency to better explain our
results.  Also, previous research has examined
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the impact of the organization’s IT vision as a
moderator of relationships in CIO impact studies
(e.g., Armstrong and Sambamurthy 1999).  Items
were included in the present survey to capture the
similarity in IT vision between the pairs of CIOs
and peers to determine whether it moderated the
CIO influence behavior–outcome relationship.  In
addition, demographic data were collected and
used to determine how similar the CIOs and peers
were to each other, and to demonstrate that the
sample of CIOs and non-CIO executives were
peers, as per Howell and Higgins (1990).  We also
captured data on the CIO reporting relationship,
which allowed us to test whether this was a
significant moderator.
Pretest
The questionnaire instruments employed in this
study had not been previously used in exclusively
top executive environments; as well, some new
instruments were created specifically for this
study.  A two-stage pretest was used to test all of
the instruments for nomological and content
validity.  The first step involved 10 academics
(faculty members and Ph.D. students) who
reviewed the survey as well as the research
model.  This led to minor item modifications and
stylistic changes to the instrument.  The second
pretest stage involved eight CIOs and eight
related peer executives, who were asked to
respond to the full questionnaire and to provide
additional information, such as the time it took
them to complete the questionnaire.
A follow-up telephone conversation was held with
each pretest respondent to better gauge their
reaction to the survey and to discern whether any
questions or instructions were unclear, whether
the questions were meaningful and valid to them,
and whether potentially important dimensions
might have been omitted.  Two major changes
were made to the instrument as a result.  The first
involved the rewording of certain questions in the
IBQ section of the survey (which had originally
been developed for use with non-executive
workers, e.g., first line supervisors).  Some ques-
tions were inappropriately worded for the top
executive environment.  The other change in-
volved rewording of instructions (i.e., the words
“initial attempt or attempts” were added) to better
clarify how the CIO influenced the peer executive
during the introductory phase of the SIS initiative.
Main Study Questionnaire
Distribution
The main survey instrument was distributed to a
sample of CIOs and their peers.  CIO contact
names were initially obtained from the Directory of
Top Computer Executives database from Applied
Computer Research (ACR), a database used pre-
viously by other IS researchers studying CIOs
(e.g., Armstrong and Sambamurthy 1999; Segars
and Grover 1998).  
The CIOs were telephoned to qualify them and a
peer for the study.  In each organization, the
context for the influence attempt(s) was to be a
specific SIS project initiated by the CIO sometime
during the previous 18 months, for which the
CIO’s goal was to obtain the commitment of the
target.  Following Pearce and Robinson (1987),
SIS projects were defined as projects sufficiently
important that they required approval from top
management.  Both informants had to consider
the proposed project to be strategic to the
organization.  It was required that the CIO had a
peer relationship with the other responding execu-
tive.  The CIO must have also worked with the
peer for at least six months (Yukl et al. 1992).
A total of 459 eligible CIOs were contacted and
asked to participate; 144 agreed.  Each CIO was
asked to identify a specific SIS project, and to
nominate a specific peer executive to also take
part in the study.  In all, 288 questionnaires were
distributed.  In each organization, one question-
naire was to be filled out by the CIO, the other by
the peer executive.  The CIOs and peers were
verbally instructed to confine their survey re-
sponses to the introductory phase of the project.
A total of 75 matched pair surveys (i.e., both the
CIO and peer from the same company) were
returned.  Six of the matched pair surveys were
deemed unusable.  Thus, 69 matched-pair re-
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sponses were available to use in the subsequent
analysis, a number adequate for analysis using
PLS (Barclay et al. 1995).  This represents an
effective response rate of 15 percent (Segars and
Grover 1998), and reflects the challenge of
obtaining survey responses from top-level execu-
tives noted in other studies (for example, Ferratt et
al. [1999] reported a 10 percent response rate for
a top IS executive survey, despite the fact that
their study was sponsored by an IS industry
association).
Follow-Up Interviews
To assist in the interpretation and explanation of
the results, follow-up telephone interviews were
conducted with 13 of the executives who had
participated in the main study.  Ten were CIOs,
three were peers, but not from the same com-
panies as the CIOs.  All of these executives
indicated on their surveys that they would be
interested in a telephone interview. 
Analyses and Results
Tables 3 and 4 provide key demographic statistics
for the firms, CIOs, and peers.  A total of 49
industries were represented in the sample.  Paired
t-tests and P2 tests were used to determine
whether any significant differences existed
between the CIOs and peer executives with
respect to demographic characteristics.  The CIOs
and peers were similar in all respects (see
Table 4), except company tenure.  However, this
difference did not appear substantive.
Reliability Analysis
Partial least squares (PLS) analysis was used to
analyze the survey data (Chin and Frye 1995).
Reliability analysis was conducted at the item
level to determine whether any items should be
discarded.  This analysis was done on the data
collected from the CIOs, in the case of the influ-
ence outcome construct, and from the peers, in
the case of the influence behaviors, in order to
control for self-report bias (Golden 1992).  Of the
33 items, 16 did not contribute to adequate levels
of reliability, exhibiting loadings less than 0.7.
This situation is common when new or standard
scales are initially used in causal modeling
(Barclay et al. 1995).
The weak items were reexamined and a number
of them were subsequently eliminated.  As a
result, the scale for ingratiation was discarded,
personal appeal was measured by a single item,
and consultation, exchange, and coalition were
each measured by two items (see Table 5).  While
three or more items per scale are preferable, other
studies have utilized measures with just one or
two items comprising certain scales (e.g., Ang and
Straub 1998; Gefen and Straub 1997).  The
internal consistencies of all scales subsequently
exceeded .70, a level deemed acceptable for
exploratory research (Fornell and Larcker 1981).
Convergent and Discriminant
Validity
The matrix of loadings and cross-loadings (see
Appendix B) was examined for convergent validity:
items loading strongly on the constructs they
intended to measure.  The loadings ranged from
.713 to .967, a better result than is common in
exploratory IS research (e.g., Barclay et al. 1995;
Thompson et al. 1994).  As well, high cross-
loadings (i.e., greater than 0.5) were not
observed, providing evidence of discriminant
validity (Barclay et al. 1995).  Additionally, Table 6
demonstrates the constructs’ strong discriminant
validity.  A commonly accepted criterion for con-
struct discriminant validity is that the average
variance shared between a construct and its
measures should be greater than the variance
shared between the construct and other con-
structs in the model (Barclay et al. 1995).  The
diagonal elements are the square roots of the
average variance extracted; the off-diagonal ele-
ments are the inter-construct correlations.  Good
discriminant validity is demonstrated because all
the diagonal elements are greater than corre-
sponding off-diagonal elements (Barclay et al.
1995).
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Table 3.  Responding Company Profiles
Category Mean Median
1997 Revenues (in $US millions) 2,036 804
Number of Employees 4,567 2,400
Age 59 years 55 years
Note:  Of the companies responding, 33% were based in the United States and 67% were based in
Canada.
Table 4.  Demographic Profile of Matched Pairs
Characteristic
Mean or % for
CIOs
Mean or %
for Peers p < .05
Age 46.91 45.71 No
Gender 86% males 91% males No
Tenure with Company 9.78 12.20 Yes
Tenure in Current Job 4.01 3.79 No
Reporting Level 1.49 1.41 No
Member of Top Management Team 60.3% 71.0% No
Technical Background 4.44 4.21 No
Note:  Paired t-tests were used for continuous variables and P2 tests for categorical variables











Rational Persuasion Peer 4 0.848 q22
Consultation Peer 4 0.794 q5 and q25
Personal Appeal* Peer 4 1.000 q18, q15, and q 34
Ingratiation** Peer 4 NA All
Exchange Peer 4 0.768 q20 and q36
Coalition Peer 4 0.876 q2 and q35
Pressure Peer 4 0.865 q33
Influence Outcome CIO 5 0.871 q45
Notes:  *Only one item used. **Deleted due to reliability concerns.
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Table 6.  Construct Correlations
RP CON PA EX COAL PR IO
Rational Persuasion 0.810
Consultation 0.403 0.812
Personal Appeal 0.048 0.097 1.000
Exchange 0.015 0.035  0.265 0.790
Coalition 0.036 -0.099 -0.137 -0.103 0.883
Pressure 0.126 0.325 -0.343 0.330 -0.440 0.826
Influence Outcome 0.309 -0.116 0.150 -0.306 -0.176 -0.295 0.793
Results
PLS was used to test the propositions (proposi-
tion 4 was not tested since no ingratiation item
survived the measurement model assessment).
The results revealed that 32.6 percent of the
variance in influence outcome was explained by
the independent constructs (see Figure 2).
Table 7 provides a more complete statistical sum-
mary of the results.
Proposition 1, which focused on the relationship
between rational persuasion and the influence
outcome, was supported.  Rational persuasion
appears to have a positive impact on the influence
outcome and is likely to lead to commitment.
Proposition 2, concerning the relationship be-
tween consultation and influence outcome, was
not supported.  Proposition 3, regarding the rela-
tionship between personal appeal and influence
outcome, was supported.  This suggests that
personal appeal may be an effective influence
behavior to use in lateral influence attempts in top
executive environments.  However, only one item
was used to measure personal appeal, so this
result should be viewed cautiously.
Proposition 5, which centers on the negative
relationship between exchange and the influence
outcome, was also supported.  The result sug-
gests that as the use of exchange increases, the
influence outcome moves toward resistance.
CIOs that use this behavior are more likely to
encounter resistance to the SIS projects they
promote.  Thus, it appears that in relationships
between CIOs and their peers (i.e., senior man-
agement environments), exchange is unsuc-
cessful.  Proposition 6, focusing on the relation-
ship between coalition and influence outcome,
was not supported.  Proposition 7, the negative
relationship between pressure and influence
outcome, was weakly supported (p < .10) and
should be viewed with caution.  
We also tested the model to see if the results
would still hold true if we just used a subsample of
CIOs that were part of the top management team.
CIOs that are not part of their top management
team may behave differently with their peers due
to differences in power, status, etc., as compared
to CIOs who are top management team members
(e.g., Earl and Fenny 1994; Lederer and Mende-
low 1988).  The overall pattern of results was the
same as the full sample.  Rational persuasion and
personal appeal had positive impacts on the
influence outcome; exchange and pressure had
negative impacts.  Personal appeal was significant
at the .01 level.  However, rational persuasion was
only significant at the .10 level and exchange and
pressure were not significant.  While it may be
that the pattern for CIOs who are part of the top
management team is different from those who are
not, the small sample size in this study makes it
impossible to answer the question with any
degree of assuredness.  Additionally, the results
of PLS tests used to determine the impact of the
moderators were inconclusive.  Both of these
issues are discussed in the limitations section.
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*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01
Notes:  Propositions in bold supported, () indicate relationship predicted.
Figure 2.  Results




P1:  RP – IO .326 3.563***
P2:  CON – IO -.086 -1.170
P3:  PA – IO .338 3.210***
P5:  EX – IO -.299 -2.060**
P6:  COAL – IO -.100 -.407
P7:  PR – IO -.254 -1.765*
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01
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Discussion
Consistency with Prior Research
This paper has demonstrated that of the influence
behaviors at the disposal of CIOs, not all are
equally effective during the introductory phase of
a new SIS project.  For instance, rational per-
suasion appears to have a positive impact on the
influence outcome and is likely to lead to
commitment.  The positive relationship between
rational persuasion and commitment found in this
study compares favorably with other studies using
managers at three different levels in the
organizational hierarchy (Yukl and Tracey 1992).
This result is also consistent with anecdotal
literature concerning top executive behavior (Nutt
1986).  Thus, CIOs are encouraged to “do their
homework” when proposing new, SIS proposals
so they can provide a compelling, rationally
argued case for how these proposals can benefit
the organization. 
Although weakly supported, the result for propo-
sition 7 is consistent with middle-level and senior
management peer studies.  In their study of influ-
ence attempts directed at peers, Falbe and Yukl
(1992) and Yukl and Tracey (1992) found that
pressure was unsuccessful.  Research on lateral
influence behaviors of CIOs and top managers
also reveals that pressure is an unsuccessful
tactic (e.g., Earl and Feeney 1994; Tinnirello
1996).  As one executive explained, “the rela-
tionship aspect of the influence attempt is most
important and pressure works against the trust
that has been developed in that relationship.”
The implication for CIOs is that pressure appears
to lead to an unsuccessful outcome when influ-
encing peers about SIS projects.
The proposition which dealt with the relationship
between the use of coalition tactics and the
influence outcome was not supported.  This result
is consistent with the statistically insignificant
findings from Yukl and Tracey’s study.  A larger
sample size may have increased the likelihood of
detecting a significant relationship between coali-
tion and the influence outcome, although the
power analysis suggests otherwise.  Thus, CIOs
should use coalition tactics with caution.
Challenges to Prior Work
Proposition 3, concerning the relationship be-
tween personal appeal and the influence outcome,
was also supported.  The Falbe and Yukl and Yukl
and Tracey studies found that personal appeals
were either intermediate in effectiveness (led to
compliance) or led to commitment when used on
peers.  The inconsistent results between these
studies may have to do with the fact that the Falbe
and Yukl study used MBA students and the Yukl
and Tracey study used a mixed sample of
informants from three different levels in the organi-
zations’ hierarchies, including top executives.
This suggests that personal appeal may operate
differently in the top executive environment.
This is consistent with the findings from other data
collected for this study.  For instance, a number of
executives in the focused interviews suggested
that personal appeal was often used successfully
within the confines of the top management group.
As the interviews demonstrated, SIS project
approval has much to do with networks of trust:
who knows whom.  The post-survey follow-up
interviews also suggested that trust was a key
factor underlying the success of personal appeal
behaviors.  If the CIO had a good track record with
IS projects and had established a relationship of
trust with a peer, then it was likely that the peer
would be swayed by personal appeal behaviors.
As one of the executives remarked,  “a lot of
people do not understand much about technology;
it costs a lot of money, and they want someone
they can trust.”
It was demonstrated that the use of exchange
behaviors is generally unsuccessful when utilized
by CIOs in top management–peer interactions
concerning SIS projects.  Use of exchange often
results in resistance in such cases.  This finding is
inconsistent with some of the influence behavior
studies conducted with middle-level managers,
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where it was found that exchange was effective in
gaining compliance or commitment (e.g., Falbe
and Yukl 1992; Yukl and Tracey 1992).  However,
anecdotal evidence has suggested that some top
managers, including IS managers, encounter
resistance when they use this type of behavior
(e.g., Cohen and Bradford 1990; Kotter 1979).
Thus, it appears that, in relationships between
CIOs and their peers in a senior management
environment, exchange is unsuccessful.  Further
research is needed to confirm this difference since
there is some evidence that exchange can be
used successfully to secure business executives’
funding of IT infrastructure (Ross and Beath
2002).  Future research is also required to dis-
cover if the impact of exchange behavior is con-
sistent across top executives in other functional
areas, indicating differences between top and
middle-level managers, or if it is only true for
CIOs, indicating differences between CIOs and
their peers.
Proposition 2, concerning the relationship be-
tween the use of consultation and the influence
outcome, was not supported.  This is a surprising
result, since the IS management literature clearly
indicates the importance of consultation (e.g., in
the form of user involvement).  Reich and
Benbasat (1996) and others have argued that
effective CIOs exhibit consultative behavior to
communicate key IT issues to others (Earl 1993;
Earl and Feeny 1994; Lederer and Mendelow
1988).  In addition, other peer influence literature
suggests that consultation leads to commitment
(Falbe and Yukl 1992; Yukl and Tracey 1992).
Our initial fieldwork also observed consultation
being used for successful IS projects.  Effective
CIO influence behaviors included personal
consultation with the targets of influence.  One
possible explanation for this result is that the items
associated with consultation, based upon Yukl
and Falbe’s (1990) original instrument, did not
adequately reflect the consultation behaviors of
CIOs (nor did the initial interviews bring this to our
attention).  Improvements to the current survey
questions, including additional interviews with top
executives to refine what is meant by consultation
in their environment, is clearly necessary for future
research in this area.
Future Model Development
Since the research model accounts for only 32.6
percent of the variance in the dependent variable,
there is room to enhance its explanatory power.
Clearly, numerous factors such as other sources
of CIO power not explicitly examined (control over
scarce resources, where the CIO resides in the
social network, their level of managerial expertise,
etc.) and the peer’s assessment of these sources
of power, likely have a bearing on the outcome
(Earl and Feeny 1994; Tedeschi et al. 1972; Yukl
1994).  Similarly, the study reported in this paper
could be replicated with a sample of CIOs that are
all part of the top management team to see if the
pattern of relationships still hold as well as to
examine the impact on the dependent variable.
These factors reveal opportunities for future
research to achieve a fuller explanation of the
variation in the influence outcome variable.  
Good working relationships with peers are a
necessary condition for the success of IT
executives’ (Earl 1993; Henderson 1990; Keen
1991; Stephens et al. 1992).  This research has
revealed that rational persuasion and personal
appeal influence behaviors are likely to be most
effective when seeking commitment to SIS pro-
jects in cases where the CIO has an established
relationship with a peer.  Furthermore, CIOs have
been cautioned that they should communicate
with other executives in non-technical language,
and that they should characterize SIS projects as
initiatives that assist the business, not as IT pro-
jects (Earl and Feeny 1994; Feeny et al. 1992;
Stephens et al. 1992).  Engaging in the preferred
language of other executives demonstrates CIO
sensitivity to their peers’ concerns and should play
a role in the CIO’s ability to exert influence effec-
tively.  Thus, it is important for future research to
more fully examine what constitutes a good
working relationship between a CIO and a peer,
as well as predicting its impact on the effective-
ness of influence behaviors.
The ability to package SIS proposals, with the use
of rational persuasion, as win–win initiatives for
the peer, the CIO, and the business may
significantly impact the outcome of the influence
Enns et al./CIO Lateral Influence Behaviors
170 MIS Quarterly Vol. 27 No. 1/March 2003
attempt.  A CIO has a greater likelihood of
success when appropriate influence behaviors are
used in conjunction with SIS project proposals
consistent with the strategic orientation of the firm.
Conversely, if peers view SIS projects as CIOs
looking after their own self-interest, they will likely
reject them (Earl and Feeny 1994; Lederer and
Mendelow 1988).  Future research could examine
these compelling relationships.
Additionally, the ability of the CIO to understand
the peer executive’s organizational culture and
context—to see things through his/her eyes—is
likely to be an important contributor to the out-
come of an influence attempt by the CIO.  This is
similar to the role of shared understanding, shown
in other studies to be important for CIO effec-
tiveness (Earl 1993; Feeny et al. 1992; Reich and
Benbasat 1996).
Research in the influence area should examine
the impact of other contextual factors on a peer’s
acceptance of an SIS project.  For example, the
nature of competition in the industry, the long-term
and short-term financial stability of the organi-
zation, other projects that compete for resources,
socially unacceptable behaviors, and considera-
tion of the target’s personal style can be important
determinants of a peer’s decision to reject or
commit to an SIS project (Dutton et al. 2001;
Hambrick and Mason 1984; Lederer and
Mendelow 1988, Yukl 1994).
Limitations
The study demonstrated the reliability and validity
of a new scale associated with the influence out-
come construct.  However, more work needs to be
done to refine the influence measures and the
accompanying instructions.  The ingratiation scale
did not demonstrate adequate psychometric pro-
perties and had to be dropped from the analysis.
A single item was used to measure personal
appeal, and two items were used to measure
exchange and coalition behaviors.  One possible
explanation for the lack of support for the consul-
tation proposition is that the items associated with
consultation did not adequately reflect the consul-
tation behaviors of CIOs.  Therefore, future
researchers should try to create more robust
measures for these constructs and additional
ones that may be relevant.  For instance, although
the IBQ ought to be consulted since it provides a
taxonomy of commonly used influence behaviors
and associated descriptions, we suggest that an
instrument designed to specifically measure CIO
and other top management influence behaviors
should be developed.  We believe that the best
starting point would be to follow Churchill’s (1979)
suggestions on how to create solid measures.
CIOs and other top executives should also be
heavily involved in the process of developing
these measures for tasks such as face validity
determination and pretests.
As for the questionnaire instructions, the respon-
dents may have misinterpreted the phrase initial
influence attempt or attempts.  In spite of the
directions to focus on the introductory phase of
the project, some might have responded with
respect to later influence attempts.  Although none
of the participants indicated any confusion about
this, future researchers should strive to refine the
language associated with the influence behavior
scales and instructions.
As mentioned earlier, inconclusive results were
obtained after the control variables were
assessed.  For example, the extent to which the
CIO and peer executive had similar or different
technical backgrounds was examined as a pos-
sible moderating influence.  However, the split
data set analysis (for details of the technique
used, see Keil et al. 2000) resulted in instability in
the PLS model due to insufficient data and led to
inconclusive outcomes.  The same analytical
approach was used to analyze the moderating
effect of similarities and differences in IT vision,
and whether the CIO reported to the CEO or not,
on the influence behavior–outcome relationship.
The results of these analyses were also incon-
clusive.  Clearly, a larger sample size is required
for analyses of these moderators in future
research.
This study was also limited to examining initial
influence attempts, and the survey did not allow
for analysis of the impact of influence behavior
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combinations (e.g., Falbe and Yukl 1992).
Studies of CIO influence behaviors that include
follow-up attempts and influence behavior combi-
nations may shed additional light on our findings.
Finally, consistent with some IT literature (e.g.
Earl and Feeny 1994; Lederer and Mendelow
1988; Ross and Feeny 2000), this study only took
into account situations where the CIO initiates an
SIS.  This is a limitation to the generalizability of
the results.  Clearly there are other members of
the top management team that initiate and
sponsor SIS proposals (e.g., Rockart 1988; Ross
and Beath 2002).  Future research could, there-
fore, examine the role and influence of the CIO in
these circumstances.  For instance, how does the
CIO effectively use his or her influence behaviors
when others initiate SISs?
Conclusion
Over the past two decades, the role of the CIO
has progressed from the new kid on the block to
respected and equal partner in many top man-
agement teams.  CIOs today play a key role in
managing issues of strategic importance to their
organizations (Maruca 2000; Ross and Feeny
2000).  They are commonly faced with promoting
SIS projects whose focus is in functional areas
outside of their direct control.  Skill at exercising
influence,  particularly lateral influence, can be a
major contributor to their success in doing this, as
well as generally indicating that they are com-
petent executives and deserve a place at the
table.  This study used interviews and a survey of
69 CIOs, together with peer executives, to better
understand the patterns of influence behavior
these CIOs utilize, and the relationship between
their influence behaviors and the extent to which
they are able to create peer commitment to SIS
projects. 
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Appendix A
Key Segments of the Research Questionnaire: 
Peer Survey Questions
1. Description of Intent
The purpose of this questionnaire is to learn how Chief Information Officers (CIOs) try to influence others
in work organizations.  For each question in this section, you are requested to provide responses that
describe your CIO’s use of a tactic in his or her initial attempt or attempts to gain your support for the
strategic information systems project named:
2. Examples of Influence Behavior Questions
Note:  The authors of the IBQ have kindly given permission to divulge the first question from each influence
behavior category.
Please describe the extent to which the CIO uses each type of behavior to influence you by selecting one
of the response choices listed below.  Try to avoid letting your general impressions of this person bias your
answers.  If a behavior is not relevant for your situation or you are unsure whether the person has used
it with you, select the first response (#1).
1. I can’t remember him/her ever using this tactic with me.
2. He/she very seldom uses this tactic with me. 
3. He/she occasionally uses this tactic with me.
4. He/she uses this tactic moderately often with me.




1. Explained the reasons for a proposed project in a clear and convincing way. ______
2. Brought somebody along to support him/her when meeting with you to propose
a new project. ______
3. Offered to do something for you in return for your support of a proposed
project. ______
4. Told you that his/her proposed project is very tentative and invites suggestions
about how to improve it. ______
5. Insisted in an assertive way that you must support a proposed project. ______
6. Complimented you on past accomplishments when asking you to support
another proposed project. ______
7. Asked you as a personal favor to support a proposed project. ______
Enns et al./CIO Lateral Influence Behaviors
176 MIS Quarterly Vol. 27 No. 1/March 2003







29. I was enthusiastic about the project. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
30. I tried to delay the project. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
31. I persisted in obtaining support for the 
project. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
32. I disapproved of the project in
discussions with other top managers. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
33. I exercised initiative in promoting the
project. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Appendix B
Matrix of Loadings and Cross-Loadings
Item Rational Consult Personal Ex. Coal. Press. Infl. Out
RP1 -0.723 -0.300 -0.040 0.175 -0.033 -0.020 0.004
RP2 -0.713 -0.381 -0.153 0.085 -0.118 -0.029 0.122
RP3 -0.967 -0.356 -0.003 -0.052 -0.002 -0.145 0.337
CON1 -0.329 -0.875 -0.129 -0.082 0.070 -0.291 0.108
CON2 -0.332 -0.744 -0.012 0.044 0.095 -0.234 0.078
PA1 0.048 0.097 1.000 0.265 -0.137 0.343 0.150
EX1 -0.001 0.196 0.357 0.800 0.000 0.347 -0.247
EX2 0.026 -0.148 0.055 0.779 -0.166 0.171 -0.236
COAL1 0.008 -0.006 0.108 0.116 -0.802 0.347 -0.092
COAL2 -0.053 0.135 0.132 0.082 -0.958 0.424 -0.192
PR1 0.205 0.476 0.321 0.204 -0.360 0.784 -0.192
PR2 0.122 0.282 0.376 0.247 -0.463 0.847 -0.209
PR3 0.028 0.129 0.197 0.337 -0.299 0.845 -0.302
IO1 -0.192 -0.012 0.023 -0.202 0.253 -0.317 0.790
IO2 -0.212 -0.121 0.142 -0.243 -0.002 -0.273 0.814
IO3 0.240 0.025 -0.042 0.346 -0.193 0.163 0.725
IO4 -0.320 -0.192 0.247 -0.184 0.121 -0.194 0.839
